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Abstract. The grave challenges of oil pollution have been over stated in several 
environmental journals. Similarly, there have been several discourses on the 
prevailing nature of Nigerian oil spill pollution. Alarmingly, the spills seem to 
have persisted, despite existing legislations sanctioning them, making it seem as 
if there was no legislation sanctioning such pollution activities ab-initio. Scholars 
state that the environmental pollution and degradation that has emanated from 
oil spill in Nigeria has led to the destruction of landscape, loss of arable farm-
lands, aesthetic environment, fishing operations, revenue, and sometime lives. 
This article shall therefore review the current legislation to identify their defi-
ciencies, as well as the perceived inability of the Petroleum Industries Bill (PIB) 
to effectively enforce against deliberate pollution. 
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Introduction 
The ideal of environmental protection forms a 
core basis for the discussions in this article. To 
proceed, we would posit, to wit, that whether in 
Nigeria or elsewhere, the discussions on sanc-
tioning as a principle of environmental law 
hinges on a justification as to why there should 
be sanctions in the first instance. Thus, it is trite 
to inquire if and why there is even a need to pro-
tect the environment.  
A consensual protection of the ecosystem has 
been viewed as the only solution to the global en-
vironmental challenges (Oks, 2015). Hence, not 
only are all of earth’s resources finite, they are 
also important for continued functionality of 
planet earth, and are interconnected with each 
other. The above position tallies with the view of 
some other environmental schools, to wit, that 
the need for environmental protection stems 
from the critical issues of maintaining good hu-
man health (Chartered Institute of Environmen-
tal Health, 2017), eliminating or at least curbing 
the notorious global warming and climate 
change challenge, reducing the depletion of 
earth’s finite resources (Mensah and Castro, 
2014), and the fact that matters of environmen-
tal concern are integral to other aspects of life 
and societal construction (such as policy and po-
litical concepts) (Scotford, 2017). 
It is therefore deducible from the foregoing that 
while environmental protection is the basis for 
environmental law, it also maintains necessary 
harmony with the other subjects of life that 
might be affected by environmental issues. In ad-
dition, the formulation of effective legislation re-
mains a key challenge for many governments.  
For this article, “effectiveness” as adopted from 
the English Oxford online dictionaries (2017) 
means “the degree to which something is success-
ful in producing a desired result; success.” It there-
fore implies that a legislation can only be deemed 
effective when it has succeeded in the purpose 
for its enactment. Similarly, “sanctioning” as 
adopted from the Merriam-Webster online dic-
tionary (2017) means “a mechanism of social 
control for enforcing a society's standards.” Relat-
ing these concepts to Nigeria, it would therefore 
be expected that legislation set out to sanction 
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pollution in Nigeria’s oil sector would have failed 
to be effective, if despite the presence of such 
seeming legislation, oil pollution continues un-
deterred.   
 
Pollution in Nigeria’s Oil Sector 
Pollution sources in Nigeria include industrial 
plants of manufacturing organizations, domestic 
household wastes and other decomposing waste, 
solid mineral mining activities, as well as petro-
leum mining activity (Kesiena and Didigwu, 
2012). Even more, a discharge of industrial and 
individual household (untreated) wastes, and 
soil erosions, as sources of this, form pollution. 
Relative to the above discourse, flooding has 
been identified as another major source of envi-
ronmental pollution in Nigeria (Kesiena and 
Didigwu, 2012). The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) announced that the 
Lagos flooding arose from rivers and streams 
overflowing their banks (Kesiena and Didigwu, 
2012).  
Furthermore, activities such as bush burning 
that results in deforestation has been highlighted 
as a source of soil pollution (Ityavyar and 
Thomas, 2012). A notable scholar has posited 
that when ground is broken for farming or com-
mercial purposes, vegetation is removed expos-
ing the soil layer to unnecessary contractions 
from construction equipment (Peters, 2015). 
Runoff and storm flow increase, while land ero-
sion is enhanced thus increasing sedimentary 
loads down the alley (Peters, 2015). This effect 
obstructs smooth flow, thus increasing flooding 
and shift in configuration of the channel bottom 
(Peters, 2015). It equally alters species of fish 
due to the changes produced in the flora and 
fauna upon which the fishes depend (Peters, 
2015).  
However, none of these pollution sources seem 
to have equaled the extent of environmental 
damage that has been caused by Nigeria’s oil and 
gas sector (Orubu et al., 2004). Indeed, scholars 
of environmental law trace a bane of Nigeria’s oil 
pollution to the 1956 discovery of oil in Oloibiri, 
Bayelsa state (Mmadu, 2013). They assert that 
the environmental pollution and degradation 
that has emanated from oil spill in Nigeria has led 
to the destruction of landscape, loss of arable 
farmlands, aesthetic environment, fishing opera-
tions, revenue, and sometime lives (Kadafa, 
2012). Instances of death resulting from oil pol-
lution in Nigeria’s Niger Delta include the re-
ported death of over 100 persons in the Jesse in-
ferno, as well as the numerous deaths from the 
Idaho crude oil platform spill which tragically af-
fected five communities (Peters, 2015).  
A reason for the huge effects the oil and gas in-
dustry has had on the Nigerian environment and 
public health, as against other common sources 
of pollution identified above, might not be un-
connected to the fact that the oil and gas sector 
is a sizable portion of the Nigerian economy 
(Akinlo, 2012; Uwakonye et al., 2006). Scholars 
believe crude oil production has become more 
relevant in contemporary times as there is yet no 
cheaper alternative to it as a form of energy (Oy-
ende, 2012). Indeed, over 80% of Nigeria’s reve-
nue comes from sale of oil produced from the Ni-
ger Delta region, which is home to Nigeria’s oil 
production (Ite et al., 2013; Oduyemi and Ogun-
tseitan, 1985; Takon, 2014). Therefore, it seems 
to be a necessary evil that the Nigerian country 
cannot escape from. It is, therefore, trite to as-
sume that while there seems to be a perceived 
usefulness of oil and gas in the Nigerian society, 
the volatility of the industry necessitates some 
regulation that would check the extent of degra-
dation caused on the environment by it. 
To address environmental issues in their oil sec-
tor, various other jurisdictions such as the 
United States Federal jurisdiction, Norway, or 
even Alberta of Canada have enacted legislation 
regulating their oil sector, while setting up en-
forcement institutions to implement provisions 
of the appropriate legislation. (Hayman and 
Brack, 2002). Nigeria has been no exception to 
this. Prior to June 1988, Nigeria’s response to en-
vironment matters seemed to be on an ad hoc ba-
sis (Ikhariale, 1989). Environmental legislations 
at the time seemed to rather be in response to 
selective challenges oil discovery and industrial-
ization brought as they came individually, rather 
than a holistic approach at examining these envi-
ronmental misconduct as collective crimes (Ola, 
1984).  
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Although the Criminal Code provided some light 
sanctions against minor environmental infringe-
ments (Criminal Code Act, 2004), the statute 
failed to make any strong preventive sanctions 
against the spate of increasing major criminal 
pollution (such as that caused by harmful waste 
discharge). This deficiency became evident from 
the Koko incident (Liu, 1992; Ogbodo, 2009). 
This incident in 1988 was as a result of some ship 
loads of toxic nuclear waste materials (which 
were allegedly imported from Italy by a contrac-
tor) dumped on a farm in Koko town near the Sa-
pele River in the former Bendel State of Nigeria, 
now Delta State 
In reaction to the shock of the incident, the Nige-
rian government organized an international 
workshop on the environment (Aina and Aded-
ipe, 1991); a conference that resulted in the for-
mulation of a National Policy on Environment 
(NPE) in 1991 (and later revised in 1999). This 
policy framework became a formula for enacting 
environmental laws in Nigeria, especially for en-
vironmental regulation within the oil and gas 
sector (Oyende, 2012).  
Paragraph 8 of the 1991 NPE states thus (Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1999): 
The legal framework as a component of the na-
tional environmental policy should be designed as 
an instrument that recognises the need to achieve 
a balance between environment, development and 
socio-economic considerations. 
Hence, it recognizes the principle of sustainable 
development as a principle that must guide the 
formation of Nigeria’s environmental laws, to-
ward achieving environmental protection. To 
ensure this, it provides that action shall be taken 
to:  
a. periodically evaluate current legislation with a 
view to updating existing provisions;  
b. streamline all legislation and regulations relat-
ing to the environment with a view to re-or-
ganising them into a holistic and integrated 
compact that recognises the cross-sectoral 
linkages of the environment;  
c. prescribe jurisdictional boundaries for law mak-
ing on the environment as well as provide clear 
responsibilities to promote coordination and 
eliminate overlapping of functions among the 
various ties of government; provide for the de-
velopment of appropriate law for environmen-
tal emergencies. 
The provisions of the NPE apparently seeks to 
provide a strong regulatory framework for the 
Nigerian environment. To wit, several environ-
mental laws have been enacted to ensure a pro-
tection of the environment under the theme of 
achieving sustainable development. (Oyende, 
2012). The World Commission on Environment 
and Development (1987) has defined sustaina-
ble development to mean a “development meets 
the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.”  
According to Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration, 
“[i]n order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an in-
tegral part of the development process and can-
not be considered in isolation from it.” (U.N Con-
vention on the Rio Declaration of Environment 
and Development, 1992). Similarly, Article 11 of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (2012) provides that “Environmental pro-
tection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of (all areas of 
policy) in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.”  
Even more, Paragraph 5 of the “Political Declara-
tion” at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
Development enforced “economic development, 
social development and environmental protec-
tion” as the “interdependent and mutually rein-
forcing pillars of sustainable development.” 
(Conference Report on World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development, 2002). Environmental 
protection is, therefore, arguably a core compo-
nent of the sustainable development principle.  
An important issue for this article is therefore 
not whether environmental laws regulating the 
oil production exist in Nigeria, but rather how ef-
fective such laws have been in achieving the de-
sired sustainable development. Indeed, to appre-
ciate the aptness of these legislative enactments 
in the oil and gas sector, one must first under-
stand the circumstantial incidents that have hap-
pened since the years of Nigeria’s foray into oil 
and gas exploration and production. 
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Extensive Oil Spill Pollution (and its Ef-
fects) as it is in Nigeria 
The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) estimates that between 1976 and 2001 
alone, there were an approximate of 6,800 spills 
totaling 3 million barrels of oil (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2006). Similarly, re-
ports showed that there were 253 oil spills in 
2006, 588 oil spills in 2007, and 419 oil spills in 
the first 6 months of 2008 (Yakubu, 2008). Cu-
mulatively, an estimated 9 to 13 million barrels 
(1.5 million tons) of oil has spilled into the Niger 
Delta over the past 53 years (Imoobe and Tanshi, 
2009).  
Marine waters in Nigeria and their basins in-
clude all navigable rivers such as the rivers Niger 
and Benue, the rivers Sokoto, Ogun, Hadejia, Ka-
duna, Gongola, Katsina- Ala, and Cross River, etc., 
and their tributaries (National Inland Water-
ways Authority Act, 2004). There are also 
smaller bodies of water enclosed by the lagoons, 
such as the Lagos Lagoon, the creeks, etc., which 
are also regarded as internal waters under the 
Act. Record has it that most parts of these rivers 
have been polluted by oil wastes, thus destroying 
aquatic life and presence in their respective 
forms (Oyende, 2012).  
An Amnesty International Report has observed 
that the repeated oil wastes that has caused dam-
age to the water system of the Niger Delta (the 
rivers, streams, ponds), is majorly constituted of 
oil spills and waste discharges from oil compa-
nies (Amnesty International, 2009). This report 
becomes interesting as several Niger Delta indi-
genes rely on fishing for their sustenance and 
survival (Amnesty International, 2009). The 
damage effect has not been limited to aquatic life 
but has also affected even the natural survival of 
man. A recent study of the United Nations Envi-
ronmental Programme (2011) found that drink-
ing water in Ogoniland (a native name for the Ni-
ger Delta), contained a known carcinogen at lev-
els 900 times above World Health Organization 
(WHO) guidelines (United Nations Environmen-
tal Programme, 2011). 
It is also a known fact that the people of the Niger 
Delta region rely mostly on agriculture for food 
and their livelihood (Oyende, 2012). Interest-
ingly, it has been reported that oil pipelines run 
across farmlands and other oil infrastructure, 
such as well heads and flow stations, which are 
often close to agricultural land (Amnesty Inter-
national, 2009). It is therefore easy for a spill to 
destroy viable crops of Niger Delta farmers. A 
study found that oil spills in the Niger Delta re-
gion reduces the ascorbic content of vegetables 
by an estimate of 36% and the crude protein con-
tent of cassava by an estimate of 40%, thus re-
sulting in a 24% increase in the prevalence of 
childhood malnutrition in the region (Ordinioha 
and Brisibe, 2013). Another has posited that 
emissions from the combustion of associated gas 
contains toxins such as benzene, nitrogen oxides, 
dioxin, etc., which increase air prone disease 
risk, insecurity of food, and damage to the 
weather (Edafienene, 2012).  
It is further asserted that oil spills on land also 
cause the ground to become toxic and this con-
stitutes a danger to plants and animals who feed 
on these materials (Oyende, 2012). Several of 
these spills have been linked to the exploration 
activities of oil multinationals in the Niger Delta 
region such as the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC) and others (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 2011). However, reports have shown that 
despite a relinquishment of some assets for-
merly belonging to some oil multinationals oper-
ating in Nigeria (such as the Shell subsidiary-
SPDC), to the Nigeria Petroleum Development 
Company (NPDC), oil pipeline spills in areas such 
as the Itsekiri and Ilaje coastal communities have 
yet continued (Amaize, 2017). 
A sustained pollution in Nigeria’s oil production 
sector, as discussed above, makes one wonder 
whether there are existing legislations in Nigeria 
sanctioning oil spill. The article shall therefore 
explore to what extent the existing legal frame-
work on oil production in Nigeria has effectively 
sanctioned oil spill.  
 
The Nigerian Constitution 
Firstly, the Nigerian constitution (1999) is the 
grundnorm of all laws in Nigeria. Section 20 of 
the Nigerian constitution provides that: “the 
State shall protect and improve the environment 
and safeguard the water, air and land, forest and 
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wild life of Nigeria.” Hence the Nigerian constitu-
tion creates an obligation on the Nigerian gov-
ernment and its enforcement organs to ensure 
environmental protection while guaranteeing 
public safety. This provision in other words, cre-
ates some form of liability for the Nigerian gov-
ernment (albeit, in circumstances where they fail 
to comply with the obligation). Interestingly, it 
includes some form of criminal liability to any Ni-
gerian government that fails (or/and has failed) 
to regulate the environmental crime in Nigeria.  
Forthwith, other environmental laws regulating 
the oil sector has been enacted. It is interesting 
that despite the apparent disregard to the Nige-
rian environment, the environmental law regime 
in Nigeria is replete with legislations of this na-
ture (Ijaiya and Joseph, 2014). Amongst such 
laws are the Petroleum Act, the Oil Pipelines Act, 
the Petroleum Production and Distribution Anti 
Sabotage Act, and the Petroleum Industries Bill. 
In this regard, these legislations will be scruti-
nized in order to determine their overall effec-
tiveness in sanctioning oil spill in Nigeria. 
 
Petroleum Act  
The Petroleum Act (1990) was enacted to regu-
late all petroleum activities in Nigeria (Orji, 
2012). Section 2(3) of the Petroleum Act man-
dates a lessee or licensee to pay “fair and ade-
quate compensation for the disturbance of sur-
face or other rights to any person who owns or is 
in lawful occupation of the licensed or leased 
land.” Indeed, the obligation created by the Act 
on a potential lessee or licensee to pay some 
form of compensation for surface disturbance is 
laudable. However, the Act fails to define or in-
terpret exactly what it deems to be “fair and ad-
equate.” The vagueness caused by the failure of 
the Act to precisely define what it deems as “fair 
and adequate” leaves the determination to the 
court, which can be belittled by a good lawyer on 
legal technicalities.   
One must adequately examine what truly consti-
tutes “disturbance to surface.” Surface disturb-
ance as it relates to the environment has been 
defined as “…exposure, covering or erosion of 
the surface of land in any manner, or the degra-
dation or deterioration in any manner of the 
physical surface of land” (Government of Al-
berta, 2017). It seems, therefore, that the Petro-
leum Act merely provided some form of financial 
liability for petroleum pollution of the Nigerian 
lands, thus neglecting petroleum pollution on the 
Nigerian waters and severe air pollution (of gas 
flaring), which constitutes a severity of the Nige-
rian pollution likewise.  
Furthermore, there seems to be a vagueness as 
to whether a scope of pollution covered by this 
provision covers just the soil, or just the plants 
and structures on the soil, or both the soil and the 
plants and structures on it. This uncertainty was 
highlighted in Shell Petroleum Development Com-
pany of Nigeria Ltd. v. Councillor F. B. Farah 
(1995). In this case, an oil well blow-out polluted 
about 60,700 hectares of land. The top soil was 
heavily contaminated but SPDC abandoned the 
rehabilitation of the land and offered only N44, 
000.00 (~$125) as compensation. The respond-
ents who had 13, 245 hectares of the affected 
land were paid only N2000 (~$5.50) for their 
crops and economic trees but no compensation 
was paid for the contaminated soil. Although the 
Act eventually awarded damages of 
N4,621,307.00 (~$12,800) the court had to rely 
on common law principles of assessment of dam-
ages for tort as the Petroleum Act provided no 
guidance for the court to rely on. 
Interestingly, the succeeding regulation borne 
out of its inadequacy has made no practical im-
provements to its deficiencies. Phrases such as 
“practicable precaution,” “up-to-date equip-
ment,” “prompt step,” “good oil field practices,” 
and “good refining practices” run through the Pe-
troleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation 
(2004) with no particular clarification as to what 
they actually entail within the Regulation. Hence 
the Regulation provides no practical interpreta-
tion of these phrases (that constitute the core 
subjects of its enactment). 
 
Oil Pipelines Act 
The Oil Pipelines Act (1956) was enacted to reg-
ulate the granting of licenses for the establish-
ment and maintenance of oil pipelines (this is 
provided for in the Preamble to the Act). This Act 
gives the holder of an oil pipeline license, right to 
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enter upon, take possession of or use a strip of 
land specified in the license and construct, main-
tain, and operate an oil pipeline and ancillary in-
stallation (Section 11[1] of Act). However, the 
Act also requires such holder to prevent poten-
tial pollution arising from such spill through its 
provision for compensation under section 11(5) 
of the Act. Section 11(5) of the Act provides thus: 
The holder of a licence shall pay compensation – 
a. to any person whose land or interest in land 
(whether or not it is land respect of which the 
licence has been granted) is injuriously af-
fected by the exercise of the rights conferred by 
the licence, for any such injurious affection not 
otherwise made good; and 
b. to any person suffering damage by reason of any 
neglect on the part of the holder or his agents, 
servants or workmen to protect, maintain or 
repair any work structure or thing executed 
under the licence, for any such damage not oth-
erwise made good; and 
c. to any person suffering damage (other than on 
account of his own default or on account of the 
malicious act of a third person) as a conse-
quence of any breakage of or leakage from the 
pipeline or an ancillary installation, for any 
such damage not otherwise made good. 
By this provision, a license holder under this Act, 
is obligated to pay compensation to a person 
whose land or interest has been affected by the 
exercise of the right under the license. A careful 
examination of section 11(5)(c) shows some 
form of defense to the license holder in the sense 
that such license holder could easily allege a 
damage of the oil pipeline that had caused a spill 
was due to the acts of a third party. Hence, a mere 
allusion as to the cause of an oil spill to be the 
willful sabotage of oil pipelines by local indi-
genes of the Niger Delta could absolve oil opera-
tors of the liability of compensating victims of 
the Niger Delta oil spills. The Act could, there-
fore, encourage an arbitrary abuse of the strict li-
ability rule by corporate oil polluters seeking to 
evade the sanction imposed by the provisions of 
the Act. The Act could, therefore, defeat the very 
purpose for its enactment.  
 
Petroleum Production and Distribution 
Anti Sabotage Act 
It is on record that several oil companies in Nige-
ria have alleged several pollutions from their fa-
cilities to pipeline sabotage and vandalism 
(Frynas, 2002). Whilst this article has tried to al-
lude to a use of sabotage by local indigenes as a 
defense to oil spill liability on the part of such op-
erators, the article yet agrees with the opinion of 
other scholars that there might be events of sab-
otage of oil pipelines by local indigenes in the Ni-
ger Delta (Augustine, 2005; British Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2010; Hinshaw and Kent, 2016).  
As had been asserted by a scholar that, “Crude oil 
is tapped from pipelines and terminals of the oil 
producing companies with advanced technologi-
cal equipment in the waterways, creeks, swamps 
and high seas. Plastic pipes are fixed to manifold 
points and intersection of several pipelines and 
crude oil is then pumped into barges. In some 
cases, ships are hooked to hoses that siphon 
crude from MNC facilities that may be several 
hundred meters away” (Ikelegbe, 2005). Shell 
Producing Development Company (SPDC) of Ni-
geria have repeatedly alleged illegal refining and 
third-party interference as a main source of pol-
lution in the Niger Delta (Shell Nigeria, 2017). 
The Petroleum Production and Distribution Anti 
Sabotage Act (1975) defines sabotage as a per-
son who:  
a. wilfully does anything with intent to obstruct or 
prevent the production or distribution of petro-
leum products in any part of Nigeria; or  
b. wilfully does anything with intent to obstruct or 
prevent the procurement of petroleum prod-
ucts for distribution in any part of Nigeria; or 
c. wilfully does anything in respect of any vehicle 
or any public highway with intent to obstruct 
or prevent the use of that vehicle or that public 
highway for the distribution of petroleum 
product. 
The Act stipulates the death penalty or an im-
prisonment term of 21 years as punishment for 
an offender under the Act. This punishment 
seems more than sufficient to sanction an envi-
ronmental crime of its sort. However, there is yet 
any known official case against oil sabotage in 
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the country. This makes it seems as if the Act is a 
toothless dog with no real sense of enforcement. 
 
Petroleum Industries Bill 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (2012) seeks to 
“provide for the establishment of a legal, fiscal 
and regulatory framework for the Petroleum In-
dustry in Nigeria and for other related matters” 
(Preamble to the Bill). This implies that the Bill 
covers all matters relative to oil and gas in Nige-
ria including environmental matters that relate 
to both spheres. Subject to Section 6(1), “The 
Federal Government shall, to the extent practica-
ble, honor international environmental obliga-
tions and shall promote energy efficiency, the 
provision of reliable energy, and a taxation pol-
icy that encourages fuel efficiency by producers 
and consumers.”  
The clause “…to the extent practicable,” Section 
6(1) above, of the Bill, reiterates the position of 
the NESREA Act as it regards international envi-
ronmental treaties and obligations on oil and gas 
matters, only shifting from the position of em-
powerment of NESREA on such international ob-
ligations to a mandate of the federal government. 
However, by employing the caveat “…to the ex-
tent practicable” the provision suddenly reduces 
the certainty on the extent to which the federal 
government can honor such international trea-
ties. This is because such caveat creates some 
form of escape to the federal government from 
committing to the international environmental 
obligations.  
Section 283 of the Bill, provides that: 
Every licensee or lessee engaged in petroleum op-
erations shall, within three months of the com-
mencement of this Act, submit an environmental 
programme or an environmental quality manage-
ment plan…which shall: 
a. Contain the licensee's written; 
b. Commitment to comply with relevant laws, reg-
ulations, guidelines and standards; 
c. Investigate, assess and evaluate the impact of 
the licensee or lessee's proposed exploration 
and production activities on-  
(i) the environment; and  
(ii) the socio-economic conditions of any per-
son who might be directly affected by the 
petroleum operations; 
d. develop an environmental awareness plan de-
scribing the manner in which the applicant in-
tends to inform his or her employees of any en-
vironmental risks which may result from their 
work and the manner in which the risks must 
be dealt with in order to avoid pollution or the 
degradation of the environment; proposed ex-
ploration and production activities on…the en-
vironment; 
e. Describe the way he or she intends to- (i) modify, 
remedy, control or stop any action, activity or 
process which causes pollution or environmen-
tal degradation; (ii) contain or remedy the 
cause of pollution or degradation and migra-
tion of pollutants; and (iii) comply with any 
prescribed waste standard or management 
standards or practices; 
Similarly, 285(1) of the Bill provides thus:  
Prior to the approval of the environmental man-
agement plan or environmental management pro-
gramme by the Minister, every licensee or lessee 
shall pay the prescribed financial provision to the 
Inspectorate in accordance with guidelines as may 
be issued by the Inspectorate from time to time, for 
the rehabilitation or management of negative en-
vironmental impacts, as a condition for the grant 
of the said licence or lease. 
Indeed, the provisions of Section 283 of the Bill 
cover a tender of EIA in the form of quality man-
agement plans. However, this Bill fails to provide 
any penalty whatsoever against a potential of-
fender who fails to tender this plan. This implies 
that if in essence, the Bill is passed into law, there 
would be no real criminal penalty sanctioning 
environmental matters in the oil and gas sector 
in Nigeria.  
Similarly, in providing that the licensee shall 
make some payments from the onset toward the 
remediation or management of environmental 
damage, Section 285 (1) of the Bill seems to an-
ticipate environmental harm even before the ac-
tual commission which (considering the fact that 
the Bill makes no actual provision for the partic-
ular amount that  shall be set aside for this pur-
pose but leaves it to the inspectorate, nor does 
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the bill provide any form of penalty for a criminal 
breach of the licensee to tender an environmen-
tal quality management plan [EQMP]), might nat-
urally make a licensee chose to pay the pre-
scribed financial provision set aside, refuse to 
tender any form of EQMP, and yet commit pollu-
tion crimes. 
Furthermore, Section 293(1) of the bill provides 
that: 
any person engaged in activities requiring a li-
cence, lease or permit in the upstream and down-
stream sectors of the petroleum industry shall 
manage all environmental impacts in accordance 
with the licensee or lessee’s approved environmen-
tal management plan or programme. It shall be 
the responsibility of every licensee or lessee as far 
as reasonably practicable to rehabilitate the envi-
ronment affected by exploration and production 
activities whenever environmental impacts occur 
as a result of the licensee or lessee’s operations. 
However, Section 293(2) of the Bill, exempts the 
licensee or lessee from liabilities for the rehabil-
itation of the environment where the act ad-
versely affecting the environment has occurred 
because of sabotage of petroleum facilities which 
includes tampering with the integrity of any pe-
troleum pipeline and storage systems. It went 
further to provide that any dispute as to the 
cause of an act that has adversely affected the en-
vironment shall be referred to the Downstream 
Regulatory Agency (which it refers to as the 
Agency) by the licensee, lessee, or any affected 
person for determination, and that such determi-
nation by the Agency shall be final. Even more, 
Section 293(4) of the Bill expressly provides 
that: 
Where the determination is that the act adversely 
affecting the environment has occurred as a result 
of sabotage, the costs of restoration and remedia-
tion shall be borne by the local government coun-
cil and the state governments within which the act 
of sabotage occurred. 
 An attribution of vicarious liability to states and 
local government councils within which any act 
of sabotage adversely affecting the environment 
has occurred is grossly unjustifiable. Firstly, this 
is because a determination by the Agency of any 
such dispute under Section 293(2) of the Bill 
seems to be a derogation of an exercise of pow-
ers that should be clearly judicial in nature. It is, 
therefore, doubtful whether the Agency (which 
is not a court or tribunal established by law and 
vested with judicial power) is competent to 
make such determination in any dispute arising 
between a licensee/lessee on the one hand and a 
local government council or state on the other.   
It is an undisputable principle of constitutional 
law that such judicial powers of adjudication can 
only be exercised by competent judicial courts or 
tribunals established under law with legal pow-
ers and capacity to adjudicate rather than an 
Agency as the PIB Bill proposes. This point has 
been well-enunciated by Nwabueze who defined 
the concept of independence of the judiciary as 
implying (Nwabueze, 1992): 
First, that the powers exercised by the courts in the 
adjudication of disputes is independent of legisla-
tive and executive powers, so as to make it usurpa-
tion to attempt to exercise it either directly by leg-
islation, as by a Bill of Attainder, or by vesting any 
part of it in a body which is not a court; secondly, 
that the personnel of the court are independent of 
the legislature and the executive as regards their 
appointment, removal and other conditions of ser-
vice. 
Similarly, in Kayili v. Yilbuk (2015), the Supreme 
Court held that: 
Section 3(2) of the Chiefs (Appointment and Dep-
osition) Law of Northern Nigeria 1963 which pro-
vided that in the case of any dispute, the Governor, 
after due inquiry and consultation with the per-
sons concerned in the selection, shall be the sole 
judge as to whether any appointment of a Chief 
has been made in accordance with native law and 
custom was null and void because the provision 
purported to oust the unlimited jurisdiction of the 
State High Court and conferred same on the Gov-
ernor. 
Secondly, relying on the ruling on the 
SPDC/Bodo case (The Tides Newspaper, 2014), 
it can be presumed that the licensee or lessee has 
a general shielding and caring obligation toward 
the host community to protect it against avoida-
ble harm arising from its operations. An estab-
lished common law rule is that:  
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The one who carries out hazardous activity on 
land is responsible for failing to anticipate and 
minimise the damaging effect of all trespassers, 
even those who are ill-intentioned. If a facility is 
not adequately secured against such trespassers, 
then the owner or operator of that facility can, be 
at least partly responsible for the damage done to 
third parties by, for example, thieves or others who 
have malicious intent (Leader et al., 2014).   
Interestingly, the provisions of Section 293(4) of 
the Bill do not only seem to go against this case 
law, but also seems to contradict the provisions 
under Section 4.1 of the extant Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum In-
dustry in Nigeria which states that "an operator 
shall be responsible for the containment and re-
covery of any spill discovered within its opera-
tional area, whether or not its source is known. 
The operator shall take prompt and adequate 
steps to contain, remove and dispose of the spill” 
(Department of Petroleum Resources, 1992). 
It is notable that even in tort, “the party that has 
the greatest control over the risks, and can re-
duce them most effectively should be assigned li-
ability” (Tuytel and Dyke, 2011). This is because, 
“imposing liability on parties who are in the best 
position to mitigate risks provides incentives to 
do so” (Tuytel and Dyke, 2011). Hence, consider-
ing the fact that one of such prominent operators 
in Nigeria, such as Shell who ranks top ten on the 
Fortune 500 (Fortune, 2017), it is only a reason-
able expectation that in a case of satisfaction of 
liability between them and the host community, 
the former would rather be in the best position 
to mitigate the risks of sabotage. Thus, a defense 
of sabotage does not provide an automatic shield 
to them as the operator or owner of the facility 
unless it is established that all reasonable dili-
gence has been exercised to secure and super-
vise the facility against interference by third par-
ties.  
Interestingly, relying on the rationale for a vicar-
ious liability relationship to exist being that 
there has to be a special relationship between 
the parties, there seems to be no grounds set out 
under the Bill on identifying the special relation-
ship between any oil-producing host state/ local 
government council and the perceived third-
party saboteurs within the boundaries of the 
said states and local government councils. 
Hence, there seems to be no justifiable grounds 
to impose a vicarious liability on the third party.  
Indeed, until identified that any such relation-
ship exists between oil-producing host states/ 
local government councils and vandals of petro-
leum facilities and installations, and a clear 
ground of such identification is shown, it would 
rather be unjustifiable to place any liability on 
oil-producing host states/local government 
councils. Thus, in Gilbert Okoroma & Ors v. Nige-
rian Agip Oil Co., Ltd. (1976), Manuel, J., dismiss-
ing the defense of sabotage raised by the defend-
ant, held that “the act of a third party is a good 
defence . . . but evidence must be led either to 
identify such third party or show circumstances 
to lead to an irresistible conclusion of the act of 
third party whose act was neither unforeseeable 
nor controllable by the defendant.”  
Even more, Section 116 of the Bill proposes the 
establishment of the Petroleum Host Communi-
ties Fund (PHC Fund) toward developing the 
economic and social infrastructure of the com-
munities within the petroleum producing area in 
accordance with Section 117 thereof. To give ef-
fect to Section 117, Section 118(1) of the Bill pro-
vides that upstream petroleum producing com-
pany shall remit on a monthly basis ten per cent 
of its net profit into the PHC Fund. Section 118(1) 
(a) and (b) of the Bill provides the beneficiaries 
of the PHC Fund to be the host communities 
within the petroleum producing areas and the 
petroleum producing littoral states.  
 Curiously, Section 118 (5) of the Bill creates a 
loophole which can be exploited as a dangerous 
escape which can result to a depletion of the 
Fund to the detriment of host communities; by 
providing that in the event of vandalism, sabo-
tage, or other civil unrest occurs that causes 
damage to any petroleum facilities within a host 
community, the cost of repair of such facilities 
shall be paid from the Fund unless it is estab-
lished that no member of the community was re-
sponsible for the damage. The danger the be-
comes thus: giving the persistent allegations of 
vandalism and sabotage of petroleum facilities 
by oil companies against host communities and 
the very fact that this has been found to be mere 
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allegation to escape liability, it might be unsur-
prising that virtually any damage to petroleum 
facilities within host communities could be at-
tributed to the host communities with the result 
that cost of repairs of damaged petroleum facili-
ties would simply become a drain on the Fund.  
 By stating; “…the cost of repair of such facility 
shall be paid from the PHC Fund entitlement un-
less it is established that no member of the com-
munity is responsible” Section 118(5) of the bill 
seems to place the burden of proving that no 
member of the host community was involved or 
responsible for the act of vandalism or sabotage 
that caused damage to petroleum facilities 
within the host community, on the host commu-
nity. It, therefore, might not be so wrong to pre-
sume the placement of the burden of proof of in-
nocence on the host community might defeat the 
purpose of the PHC Fund, as failure by the host 
community to discharge the burden of proof in 
any given case implies that the PHC Fund that 
has accrued in favor of the host community will 
be applied to off-set the cost of repairs to the 
damaged facilities and installations. In this way, 
the Petroleum Host Communities’ Fund could be 
drained for purposes other than that for which it 
is primarily proposed.  
It is notable that besides the fact that this bill 
provides no seeming strict criminal penalty 
sanctioning oil pollution, and provides no cer-
tainty as to the legal obligation imposed on the 
Federal government to abide by international 
treaties for the protection of the environment, it 
also seems to be in favor of oil operators as it 
provides clear escape route from some liabilities 
that might have deterred the extent of criminal 
pollution they cause in the Niger Delta. It is, 
therefore, almost clear that although the oil and 
gas sector presents the worst spate of criminal 
pollution in the country, the PIB, which ordinar-
ily should have become a standard of environ-
mental protection and punishment of criminal 
pollution within the country, provides no real so-
lution in the sense.  
It is provided under the Preamble of Bill that it 
seeks to address environmental concern in the 
petroleum, and possibly, gas sector (Zacchaeus, 
2016). Upon passage, the bill shall repeal all ex-
isting legislation governing oil and gas in Nigeria 
(Section 354 of Bill). Interestingly, scholars have 
pointed out that the Bill does little or nothing in 
depleting the actual structure and content of the 
existing environmental laws in the oil and gas 
sector but rather offer mere repetitions of the ex-
isting respective legislations it was made to re-
peal (Musa and Bappah, 2014). These scholars 
have even asserted that the Bill rather seems to 
offer less solutions in terms of securing environ-
mental protection than the respective legisla-
tions its parts have been made to repeal.  
An example where the bill has merely reflected 
the structure of an existing environmental Act 
without necessarily making any addition (being 
the very essence for its drafting) is that the Bill 
(in line with the Petroleum Act 1969) stipulates 
under Section 198(2) that “a licensee or lessee 
who causes damage or injury to a tree or object 
of commercial value or which is the object of ven-
eration shall pay fair and adequate compensa-
tion to the persons or communities directly af-
fected by the damage or injury.” This provision is 
laudable in the sense that it guarantees some 
form of compensation from the offender who 
disturbs the surface. However, just like its prede-
cessor, the Bill fails to explicitly define or inter-
pret what it deems to be “fair and adequate.” Fur-
thermore, it fails to explicitly interpret what 
should be deemed as “any other right.” 
Indeed, a comparison of the above provision of 
Section 198(2) of the Bill and Section 2(3) of the 
Petroleum Act shows a clear repetition of struc-
ture and intent, together with the apparent limi-
tations reflective in both cases. This makes one 
wonder if the Bill has really made any clear addi-
tion to what already exists or merely repeated 
what is already existing (and obsolete).  
Similarly, Section 200 of the Bill provides that 
“every licensee or lessee engaged in upstream 
petroleum operations shall within one year of 
the commencement of this Act, or within 3 
months after having been granted the license or 
lease, submit an environmental management 
plan to the inspectorate for approval.” While this 
provision is laudable, the Bill provides no mech-
anism of inspecting the said plan that has been 
submitted to ensure that it is accurate nor does 
the Bill provide any mechanism for affected com-
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munities to request an inspection of sites or ar-
eas they deem to be polluted or at risk from pol-
lution. Thus, the Bill fails to encourage public 
participation in this regard.  
On May 25, 2017, the Nigerian Senate passed the 
first tranche of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), 
titled the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill 
(2016) at the Senate House, although this is yet 
to be passed at the House of Representative (the 
Nigerian National legislative arm is made up of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives and 
Bills must go through both Houses to effectively 
become an Act; Vanguard, 2017). This Bill is only 
a part of the PIB and contains just very few parts 
of the PIB. Interestingly, the PIGB does not make 
any additions to the PIB but rather only repeals 
or retains some of its sections. Virtually every 
section of the PIB that relates to environmental 
issues have been retained. This is except for the 
provision of PHCF that was reflected in the PIB 
and was repealed in the PIGB. It is therefore not 
surprising that the PIGB has provided no extra 
details to environmental matters besides what 
existed in the mother document (PIB).  
 
Conclusion 
A cursory look through the discussions above, 
shows an ineffectiveness of environmental regu-
lations in extant petroleum laws in Nigeria. In-
deed, the current structure of the PIB and its 
componential parts still fail to provide any nec-
essary solution to either of these weaknesses. It 
is the view of this article that extant petroleum 
laws in Nigerian laws has failed to reflect current 
pollution incidents in Nigeria’s petroleum sector. 
This is either because the provisions of laws have 
become outdated and not measurable to the per-
vasive nature of recent oil pollutions in Nigeria, 
or the wordings of the provisions are too vague 
to convey an adequate interpretation of the pur-
pose of the statutes. Interestingly, the PIB which 
should be a respite to the ailing petroleum sec-
tor, and which under normal circumstances, 
should create a more effective regulatory capac-
ity for environmental protection in Nigeria’s oil 
sector seems unable to do so. 
It is, therefore, a position of this article that most 
petroleum laws in Nigeria be revised to amend 
the regulatory component of such laws, espe-
cially with regards to the environment. Further-
more, a revision of such laws becomes apt to 
bring the sanctioning under the laws at par with 
the current spate of pollution activities in Nige-
ria’s oil sector. Above all, the PIB should be 
amended before its final passage as law, as its 
current state reflects no real improvement to the 
laws it had been made to repeal. 
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